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With some delay, the internationalization of business R&D is following the globalization of 
production. Starting on a small scale during the 1970s and 1980s, the emergence of globally 
distributed R&D networks of multinational enterprises (MNEs) accelerated rapidly in the 1990s. 
The “globalization of innovation” was facilitated and driven by a complex set of factors, 
including changes in  trade and investment governance, improved intellectual property rights 
through TRIPS, the growing ease and falling cost of communicating and traveling around the 
globe, and the concomitant vertical industry specialization and unbundling of value chains. The 
growing and sustained level of cross-border M&As was one major direct driver, often having the 
effect that merged firms inherited multiple R&D sites in a number of countries. 
 
Until the end of the 1990s, the geography of (business) innovation was largely congruent with 
the triad of developed world regions: North America, Europe and Japan. Developing countries 
played a subsidiary role, either primarily supplying talent (brain drain) or functioning as sector 
specialists in smaller newly industrializing economies such as Taiwan Province of China, 
Singapore and Israel. Then, around the turn of the century, two interrelated strategies led to the 
“iron cage of the triad” starting to open: a R&D FDI shift to the two main emerging economies 
of China and India, and the upward move of Indian and Chinese vendors and contract research 
organizations (CROs) from providing routine services to knowledge process and R&D 
offshoring (Bruche 2009).  
 
By around 2001, the number of MNE R&D centers had only gradually grown to under 100 in 
each of the two countries from the days of Texas Instruments’ early engagement in India in the 
mid-1980s and Motorola's pioneering R&D investments in China in the early 1990s. The 
subsequent upsurge in MNE R&D centers in China and India calls to mind a take-off situation. 
In a rather sudden shift, the number of MNE R&D centers in China rose more than tenfold to 
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around 1,100 (representing 920 MNEs) by the end of 2008 and to 780 (670 MNEs) in India 
(Zinnov 2009). The internal MNE R&D offshoring growth took place in parallel to the learning 
processes of Indian and Chinese vendors and CROs, leading to a similar expansion of R&D 
offshore outsourcing. Most surveys point to a continuation of this trend as companies report 
plans to move future R&D expansion to these two countries.  
 
Why has there been such a sudden shift to China and India? There are a number of clearly 
discernible factors. Toward the end of the 1990s, China had established itself as a global lead 
market and world manufacturing center in a number of high and medium tech industries. While 
this implied a growing need for local asset exploiting R&D, greater competitive intensity also 
required increasingly new product development for the local market. Compared to the primarily 
market and customer oriented R&D investments in China, the bulk of R&D offshoring to India is 
so far mainly asset seeking, designed to take advantage of India's large and growing low cost 
intellectual infrastructure. In India, especially US-based MNEs profited even more than in China 
from the large diaspora of highly qualified non-resident Indians in leading positions, and from 
return migration. The Chinese Government's skilful carrot and stick policy (trading market 
access for technology) and India's longstanding knowledge export promotion via privately 
owned science and technology parks are other important determinants. A push factor came from 
skill shortages in computer science and engineering in the US, and to some extent in Europe and 
Japan as well.  
 
While after 2000 China and India have become the most favoured R&D destinations of MNEs 
outside of the triad (with the exception of Israel which does however not offer a sizeable 
market), they are in competition with other emerging economies like Russia, eastern Europe or 
Brazil for R&D FDI and R&D outsourcing contracts. Although their combination of comparative 
advantages like market size, the large low cost talent pool, English communication skills (India), 
very large highly qualified diasporas and reasonably developed R&D ecosystems is a difficult 
match for competing emerging markets, escalating wage cost and attrition of qualified R&D 
personnel recently seemed to endanger this position. The financial crisis can in this context be 
seen as a windfall helping to constrain escalating costs and providing the time and space for a 
restructuring and further advancement of the talent pools in both countries.  
 
To put the MNE R&D shift to China and India into a broader perspective, some other 
circumstances need to be taken into account. First, the bulk of business R&D in large triad 
countries is still carried out in the home country, and R&D FDI flows still take place 
predominantly within the triad (Jaruzelski & Dehoff 2008). Moreover, the new MNE R&D 
investment and offshoring to China and India is limited in sectoral scope: by far the largest share 
is accounted for by information and communication technologies, in India focused on software 
and engineering R&D; the remainder is more or less covered by the health sector (pharma, 
biotech and various chemical, preclinical, and clinical services) and the automotive industry  
Finally, most MNE R&D work is concentrated in only a few regional clusters: taken together, 
Beijing & Shanghai and Bangalore/Pune/National Capital Region represent 60-80 % of all MNE 
R&D work.  
 
Even if the argument for a new geography of innovation today may be questioned, one can still 
ask whether the dynamics of the R&D shift herald the start of fundamental medium-term 
changes. Despite the dearth of systematic research on this issue, there seems to be a general 
consensus that the dominant share of MNE R&D in China and India comprises routine activities 
adapting existing designs or processes, or providing modular contributions transformed into 
innovative products and processes in the triad's higher order R&D centers. However, scattered 
evidence points to fast learning and upgrading processes resulting in ever more centers and 
CROs taking on selective regional or global roles as centers of excellence within MNEs global 
innovation networks. It is still an open question whether this will also lead to a shift in the 
geographic loci of the eventual innovation - as long as the knowledge generated is globally 
transferable and China and India lack important complementary assets for its independent 
application and integration in new products (as, for instance, in pharmaceuticals and 
automobiles), the innovation may still be realized in the MNE home countries. In this sense, the 
R&D shift may strengthen rather than weaken the triad countries' economic position, and 
especially that of the US. The argument that the catch-up of China and India can be accelerated 
by spillover effects of local MNE R&D to Chinese and Indian companies and institutions may 
have some validity. So far, however, the R&D investment levels even in more advanced Chinese 
and Indian companies are low and local challengers may even suffer from an in-situ brain drain 
to MNEs able to offer more stimulating and rewarding work to talented R&D professionals. On 
the other hand, emerging country MNEs such as Huawei from China or Tata from India have 
started to acquire or establish R&D centers in the U.S. and Europe as a way to tap into advanced 
knowledge and technology clusters. 
 
It remains to be seen how far the financial crisis will trigger changes in the ongoing R&D 
relocation plans of MNEs. MNEs under pressure may have to cut R&D spending to maintain 
core operations in their home countries. Strong companies that closely track their innovation 
drive, such as, for example, Bosch or Siemens in Germany, or Cisco and Microsoft in the US, as 
well as companies in less affected industries, e.g., pharmaceuticals, may seize the chance to 
further enhance R&D efficiency and profit from a relaxation in the talent markets in China and 
India. They may also prepare for even stronger positions after the crisis when China and India 
may still be the fastest growing markets in the world economy. While the Chinese and Indian 
Governments will certainly welcome the emergence of a new geography of innovation the 
current global crisis may trigger a renewal of a more 'techno-nationalist' stance among policy 
makers in the U.S. and Europe and lower the inclination to perceive this development in the 
frame of a long-term win-win scenario. 
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